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ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The District Court Erred In Concluding That The Prosecution Of Baker In
Kootenai County Was Barred By The Ada County Plea Agreement
A.

Introduction
A Kootenai County jury found Baker guilty of 11 counts of violating a civil

protection order that prohibited him from having any contact with his estranged
wife.

(R., pp.98-108, 122-32.) The district court ordered Baker's convictions

vacated, concluding that the Kootenai County prosecution of Baker for the 11
protection order violations occurring between May and September 2009 was
barred by an Ada County plea agreement (entered into by Baker after the
Kootenai County charges were filed, but before he was aware of them) whereby
Baker pled guilty to one count of violating the protection order and the "state"
agreed to not "file" or "pursue" any additional charges arising out of any
violations of the order before February 17, 2010. (R., pp.213-31.) The district
court erred because the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office (the prosecuting
agency in the Kootenai County case) was not a party to the Ada County plea
agreement, and the Boise City Attorney's Office (the prosecuting agency in the
Ada County case) had neither actual nor apparent authority to bind the Coeur
d'Alene City Attorney's Office in the plea negotiations that resolved the Ada
County case. (See Appellant's brief, pp.6-19.)
Baker offers a number of arguments in response, all of which he contends
support the district court's determination that the Kootenai County prosecution
was barred by the Ada County plea agreement.

First, he argues that the

language of the Ada County plea agreement is ambiguous and, as such, must
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be construed in his favor to bar the Kootenai County prosecution. (Respondent's
brief, pp.5-7.) Second, he argues that, because venue over the Kootenai County
charges was also proper in Ada County, the Boise City Attorney's Office had
authority to prevent the prosecution of the civil protection order violations in
Kootenai County. (Respondent's brief, pp.7-S.) Third, he argues that the Boise
City Attorney's Office had actual and apparent authority to bind the Coeur
d'Alene City Attorney's Office in its plea negotiations. (Respondent's brief, pp.S11.)

Finally, he argues that the doctrine of "fundamental fairness" requires

enforcement of the Ada County plea agreement to bar the Kootenai County
prosecution. (Respondent's brief, pp.11-12.) For the reasons that follow, none
of Baker's arguments have merit.

B.

The Ada County Plea Agreement Was Not Ambiguous And, Even If It
Was, The Ambiguity Did Not Entitle Baker To Dismissal Of The Kootenai
County Charges
Baker entered into a plea agreement with the Boise City Attorney's Office

to resolve the Ada County case. As articulated on the record by Baker's trial
counsel, the terms of the agreement called for Baker to plead guilty to a single
count of violating a civil protection order and, in exchange, the "state" agreed not
to "file" or "pursue" an additional charges arising out of violations of the order
before February 17, 2010. (Defendant's Exhibit A.) Apparently unbeknownst to
Baker, when he entered the plea agreement to resolve the Ada County case,
there were already charges pending against him in Kootenai County for
numerous violations of the same protection order, all occurring before February
17, 2010. (R., pp.22-24.) The Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office was not a

2

party to the Ada County plea agreement and, as far as the record shows, was
not even aware of it. Nevertheless, Baker argues, and the district court agreed,
that the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office was bound by the Ada County plea
agreement to dismiss the already pending Kootenai County charges because the
word "state" in the Ada County plea agreement was ambiguous and reasonably
led Baker to believe that the promise to not "file" or "pursue" any other charges
arising out of violations of the protection order before February 17, 2010, was
"binding on all Idaho prosecutors."

(Appellant's brief, pp.6-8; see also R.,

pp.227-29 (concluding word "state" in Ada County plea agreement was
ambiguous, such that it was reasonable for Baker to believe the agreement
would "bind all prosecutors in the State of Idaho").) Baker's argument and the
district court's ruling are incorrect; the word "state" in the orally recited plea
agreement was not ambiguous and, even if it was, the ambiguity in the Ada
County plea agreement could not bind the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office
to dismiss the already pending Kootenai County charges without the Coeur
d'Alene City Attorney's Office's consent.
Whether a plea agreement is ambiguous is a question of law. State v.
Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595, 226 P.3d 535, 537 (2010) (citing State v. Allen,
143 Idaho 267,272,141 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Ct. App. 2006)). If the language of
the

agreement

is

ambiguous -

i.e., reasonably subject to conflicting

interpretations - the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the defendant. State
v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, _,281 P.3d 90, 94 (2012); Peterson, 148 Idaho at
595,226 P.3d at 537. If, on the other hand, the language of a plea agreement is
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not ambiguous, the court "will not look beyond the four corners of the agreement
to determine the intent of the parties." Gomez, 153 Idaho at _ , 281 P.3d at 94
(citing Beus v. Beus, 151 Idaho 235,241,254 P.3d 1231, 1237 (2011)).
Idaho's appellate courts have never before considered whether the use of
the term "state" in a plea agreement binds only the prosecuting agency executing
the agreement or, instead, binds all prosecutors in the State of Idaho. At least
one other jurisdiction has concluded, however, that the generic use of the term
"government" in a plea agreement is not ambiguous and does not alone indicate
an intention by the parties to bind any prosecuting agency other than the one
entering into the agreement. See United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120
(2d Gir. 1998) ("The mere use of the term 'government' in the plea agreement
does not create an affirmative appearance that the agreement contemplated
barring districts other than the particular district entering into the agreement."
(citation and internal quotations omitted)); United States v. Abbamonte, 759 F.2d
1065 (2d Gir. 1985), overruled on other grounds Qy United States v. Macchia, 41
F.3d 35 (2d Gir. 1994), (absent evidence to the contrary, the term "the
government" in orally recited plea agreement applied only to prosecuting agency
in specific district in which the plea was entered); see also United States v.
D'Amico, 734 F.Supp.2d 321, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[I]t is well established that
even when a written plea agreement itself refers to 'the government,' that does
not make it binding on any USAO other than the USAO entering into the
agreement." (emphasis original) (citations omitted)). The reasoning of D'Amico
is particularly instructive.
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The defendant in D'Amico, a man named Watts, was charged by the
United States Attorney's Office (USAO) in the Southern District of New York
(SDNY) with several crimes, including murder.' D'Amico, 734 F.Supp.2d at 32829. Watts moved to dismiss the murder charge, arguing the prosecution of that
charge was barred by a prior plea agreement he had entered into with USAO in
the Eastern District of New York (EDNY). !Q.. at 348. The federal district court
rejected Watts' argument, first noting that the express terms of the plea
agreement upon which Watts relied "explicitly limit[ed] its reach to the EDNY,
stating that it 'cannot bind other federal, state or local prosecuting authorities.'"

!Q.. at 349. The court then explained that, even if the plea agreement had not
been so limited, Watts' claim that he :'reasonably understood" the agreement to
bar subsequent prosecutions in the SDNY had neither factual nor legal support:
[Watts] offers no meaningful support for his claim that he
"reasonably understood" the Agreement to bar subsequent
prosecutions in this District. He does not claim, for example, that
the SDNY USAO was in any way consulted or involved in the plea
negotiations. Instead, he merely points to the fact that, at his
sentencing, EDNY Assistant United States Attorney Laura Ward
("AU SA Ward") stated that, as per the terms of the Plea
Agreement, "the government moves to dismiss the remaining
charges in the indictment."
AUSA Ward's reference to "the government" is hardly
noteworthy. First of all, it is well established that even when a
written plea agreement itself refers to "the government," that does
not make it binding on any USAO other than the USAO entering
into the agreement. See Brown, 2002 WL 34244994, at *2;
Salameh, 152 F.3d at 120. Here, the written Agreement makes no
reference to "the Government" or "the United States," but rather
only to "the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District
of New York," or the "Office."
Further, in point of fact, because the Government, not the
EDNY USAO, was the party to the litigation, AUSA Ward correctly
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referred to "the government" as the entity taking the action of
moving to dismiss the indictment. Moreover, even in situation
where it would be more accurate or appropriate to refer to the
individual USAO, prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges in
open court habitually refer to "the government."
Indeed, in
Salameh and United States v. Abbamonte, 759 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir.
1985), the Second Circuit found that oral references to "the
government" by counsel during plea proceedings - oral references
that were considerably more suggestive of an agreement to bind
other USAOs that AUSA Ward's statement here - should not be
interpreted as reflecting any such intent.
In Abbamonte, for example, defense counsel stated the
terms of a plea agreement between the defendant and the SONY
USAO as follows: "The government has agreed that ... this plea
will cover all charges that could have come about by the
government arising out of these facts."
759 F.2d at 1072
(emphasis added), overruled in part on other grounds by United
States v. Macchia, 41 F.3d 35, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1994). The panel
found that there was nevertheless "no indication that the plea
agreement contemplated any restriction on prosecutions initiated in
any [other] district." See id. Similarly, in Salameh, defense counsel
(and the court) stated that under the terms of an "oral supplement"
to the plea agreement at issue, "the Government will not bring any
charges arising out of [the defendant's] entry into the United
States." 152 F.3d at 119 (emphasis added). As in Abbamonte, the
Second Circuit held that the mere use of the word "Government"
was not evidence that the agreement contemplated barring
prosecutions in districts other than the one in which the plea was
entered. See id. at 119-20.
D'Amico,

734

F.Supp.2d

at 349-50 (emphases,

ellipses,

brackets

and

parentheses original) (record citations omitted).
The reasoning of D'Amico and the cases cited therein applies equally to
the facts of this case. Baker claims he reasonably understood the Ada County
plea agreement to bind "all Idaho prosecutors" because, in orally reciting the
terms of the plea agreement, Baker's attorney represented that the "state"
promised not to pursue any additional protection order violations. (Respondent's
brief, p.6.) As in D'Amico, however, Baker does not claim, nor does the record
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indicate, that the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office (or any other prosecuting
agency in the State of Idaho) was in any way consulted or involved in the plea
negotiations that resolved the Ada County case.

Instead, Baker's argument

rests entirely on his claim that the "term 'State' is vague as it could refer to the
prosecutors

in Ada County or all prosecutors in the state of Idaho."

(Respondent's brief, p.6.) Baker has failed to show any ambiguity in the plea
agreement because his proposed interpretation, while theoretically possible, is
ultimately not reasonable. See State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491,497,283 P.3d
808, 814 (Ct. App. 2012) ("[T]o determine whether a contract, including a plea
agreement, is ambiguous, the Court's task is to ascertain whether the contract is
reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." (Citations and internal quotations
omitted)).
Just as the parties and judges in federal prosecutions "habitually refer to
'the government''' when speaking of an individual USAO, see D'Amico, 734
F.Supp.2d at 350, the parties and judges in state prosecutions routinely use the
term "state" as a shorthand way to refer to the particular prosecuting agency that
is appearing in the case. It defies reason to suggest that, in any prosecution in
which the parties reach a plea agreement that purports to bind both the
defendant and the "state," every prosecutor in the state is bound by the terms of
that agreement. Unless the agreement otherwise specifically contemplates that
other prosecuting agencies will be bound, the only reasonable interpretation of
the word "state" in a plea agreement is that it refers only to the prosecuting
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agency that is a party to the agreement.

kL see also Salameh, 152 F.3d at 119-

20; Abbamonte, 759 F.2d at 1072.
The record in this case shows that the Ada County case was prosecuted
by the Boise City Attorney's Office, acting in its appointed capacity as the
Meridian City Prosecutor. (11/5/10 Tr., p.43, Ls.13-23.) The record also shows
that it was the Boise City Prosecutor's Office that entered into the plea
agreement with Baker to resolve the Ada County Case. (11/5/10 Tr., p.43, L.25
- p.44, L.10; Defendant's Exhibit A.) Although Baker's attorney recited that the
"state" agreed not to pursue any additional charges arising out of Baker's
violation of the protection order (Defendant's Exhibit A), there is no indication in
the terms of the plea agreement or otherwise that the term "state" referred to any
prosecuting agency other than the one with whom Baker was directly dealing.
Baker's interpretation to the contrary is unreasonable and does not demonstrate
an ambiguity in the plea agreement.
Even if the term "state" in the orally recited Ada County plea agreement
was ambiguous, Baker is not entitled to relief from his Kootenai County
convictions.

There is no question that ambiguities in plea agreements are

construed in favor of the defendant. Gomez, 153 Idaho at _ , 281 P.3d at 94;
Peterson, 148 Idaho at 595, 226 P.3d at 537. However, absent a showing that
the Coeur d'Alene City Prosecutor's Office was a party to the Ada County plea
agreement, or that the Boise City Prosecutor's Office otherwise had actual or
apparent authority to bind the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office, any
ambiguity in the Ada County plea agreement could only inure to Baker's favor in
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the Ada County case. (See Appellant's brief, pp.18-19 (citing State v. Barnett,

707 N.#.2d 564, 571 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (ambiguous or not, plea agreement
entered into by one county without second county's consent could not prevent
prosecution in second county of crimes occurring in that county).

For the

reasons already set forth in the state's opening brief and incorporated herein by
reference, if Baker believed, based upon the wording of the agreement he
entered into with the Boise City Prosecutor's Office, that he could not be
prosecuted by any other prosecuting agency for crimes arising out of his
protection order violations, his remedy was withdrawal of his plea in the Ada
County case, not dismissal of the Kootenai County charges.

(See generally

Appellant's brief, pp.7-18.)

C.

There Is No Evidence That Venue Over The Kootenai County Charges
Was Also Proper In Ada County; Even If Such Evidence Had Been
Presented, The Fact That The Kootenai County Charges Could Have
Been Prosecuted In Ada County Did Not Vest The Boise City Attorney's
Office With Authority To Dismiss The Kootenai County Charges
Idaho Code § 19-304(1) sets forth the appropriate venue for offenses

committed in different counties. Specifically, the statute provides:
Offenses committed in different counties. - (1) When a public
offense is committed in part in one (1) county and in part in
another, or the acts or effects thereof constituting or requisite to the
consummation of the offense occur in two (2) or more counties, the
venue is in either county.
Relying on this statute, Baker argues that the Boise City Prosecutor's Office had
authority to prevent the Kootenai County prosecution because the telephone
calls that were the subject of the Kootenai County charges originated in Ada
County and, as such, venue over the Kootenai County charges was also proper
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in Ada County. (Respondent's brief, pp.7-S.) Baker's argument is without merit
for two reasons.
First, contrary to Baker's assertions and the district court's conclusion,
Baker never presented any evidence in connection with his motion to dismiss to
establish that the telephone calls that were the subject of the Kootenai County
charges originated in Ada County. (See generally 10/S/1 0 Tr., pp.1S-40.) In fact,
the magistrate specifically found based on the lack of such evidence that venue
was proper in Kootenai County, where the victim was alleged to have received
the telephone calls. (11/5/10 Tr., p.46, L.6 - p.47, L.23.) Baker represents to
this Court that "[t]he trial court was provided an affidavit signed by Mr. Baker,
who lives and works in Ada County, and was in Ada County when he made all
the phone calls that are the basis of all the charges in [the Kootenai County]
case." (Respondent's brief, p.7.) Baker neglects to mention, however, that he
filed that affidavit almost two months after the district court denied his motion to
dismiss, in support of a motion for change of venue.

(Compare R., pp.74-75

(order denying motion to dismiss filed 11/10/10), with pp.77-7S (motion to
change venue, filed 1/2S/11), and pp.S1-S2 (Affidavit of Carey Baker, filed
2/1/11); see also 2/1/11 Tr., p.63, L.7 - p.66, L.16.)

Because Baker did not

present any evidence in relation to his motion to dismiss to establish that venue
over the Kootenai County charges was also proper in Ada County, his argument
that the Kootenai County charges should have been dismissed on the basis of
concurrent venue necessarily fails.
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Even if venue over the Kootenai County charges was proper in both
Kootenai and Ada Counties, such did not give the Boise City Prosecutor's Office
authority to prevent the Kootenai County prosecution of the 11 protection order
violations of which Baker was ultimately convicted.

Pursuant to I.C. § 50-

208A(2), city attorneys are authorized to prosecute "those violations of county or
city ordinances, state traffic infractions, and state misdemeanors committed
within the municipal limits." (Emphasis added.) See also I.C. § 31-2604(1)

(duty of county prosecutor to "prosecute or defend all actions, applications or
motions, civil or criminal, in the district court of his county in which the people,
or the state, or the county, are interested, or are a party ... " (emphasis added)).
Because city attorneys are only authorized to prosecute offenses committed
within the municipal limits in which they are appointed, it follows that they cannot
prevent the prosecution of offenses committed in a different municipality. This is
true even if venue over the offense is proper in both places.
Idaho Code § 19-304(1) dictates only that, when a public offense is
committed partially in one county and partially in another, venue lies in either
county. That venue may be proper in more than one county pursuant to I.C. §
19-304(1) does not divest a city prosecutor of his or her statutorily authorized
discretion to charge a crime that indisputably occurred at least in part within the
limits of the specific municipality in which he or she is appointed. In fact, the only
statutory limitations on such authority arise out of I.C. § 19-305, which provides
"that a prosecution in one (1) county shall be a bar to a prosecution for the same
act or offense in the other county" (emphasis added), and I.C. § 19-316, which
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provides that U[wJhen an offense is within the venue of two (2) or more counties,
a conviction or acquittal thereof in one county is a bar to a prosecution or
indictment therefor in another." These limitations (which are essentially statutory
bars against being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense) have no
application in this case, however, because Baker was ultimately not prosecuted
or convicted in the Kootenai County case of the "same act or offense" of which
he was convicted in Ada County pursuant to the Ada County plea agreement. 1
Even if venue over the Kootenai County charges was also proper in Ada
County, the Boise City Prosecutor's Office did not have authority to prevent the
prosecution of Baker in Kootenai County for the 11 protection order violations
that occurred at least in part in that county. Baker's argument to the contrary is
without merit.

D.

The Boise City Prosecutor's Office Had Neither Actual Nor Apparent
Authority To Bind The Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office In The Plea
Negotiations That Resolved The Ada County Case
The state argued in its opening brief that the Boise City Prosecutor's

Office had neither actual nor apparent authority to bind the Coeur d'Alene City
Attorney's Office in the plea negotiations that resolved the Ada County case.
(Appellant's brief, pp.7-19.) In response, Baker notes a split of authority on this
issue but argues that "the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Statutes, indicate county

1 The Coeur d'Alene City Prosecutor's Office originally charged Baker with 12
counts of violating the civil protection order, with one of the counts, Count VI,
being based on the same act that gave rise to Baker's prosecution in Ada
County. (R., pp.22-24.) The magistrate dismissed Count VI before trial,
concluding that prosecution of that charge in Kootenai County was barred by
statute (presumably I.C. § 19-305). (R., pp.72, 74; 11/5/10 Tr., p.45, Ls.2-22.)
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prosecutor's [sic] can bind one another to agreements made with defendants."
(Respondent's brief, p.S; see also p.11 ("[S]tate prosecutors have actual and
apparent authority to bind one another through their plea agreements because
the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Statutes indicate their authority is not limited to
their prospective county lines).) Baker is incorrect.
As noted by the state in its opening brief and again in Section C, supra,
Idaho Code § 50-20SA(2) specifically limits the authority of a city attorney to
prosecute only those crimes committed within the limits of the municipality in
which the attorney is appointed.

(Appellant's brief, pp.16-17.)

Because, by

statute, the Boise City Attorney's Office's authority did not extend beyond
municipal lines, it did not have actual or apparent authority to prevent the Coeur
d'Alene City Attorney's Office from pursuing its prosecution of Baker for the 11
civil protection order violations that were committed in the city limits of Coeur
d'Alene. (Id.)
Baker does not even cite I.C. § 50-20SA(2), much less attempt to explain
why that statute does not control the outcome of this case. Instead, Baker relies
on the constitutional provision and statutes dealing with the authority of county
prosecutors to prosecute crimes in the State of Idaho. Baker's reliance on these
provisions is misplaced because both the Ada County and Kootenai County
prosecutions were instituted by an office of the city attorney, not by the
prosecuting attorney for each respective county. Nevertheless, to the extent the
constitutional and statutory provisions on which Baker relies are even relevant,
nothing therein supports Baker's assertion that prosecutors from different
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counties can bind one another to their plea agreements without the other's
consent.
Article V, § 18 of the Idaho Constitution, relied on by Baker, merely
provides for the election in every county of a single prosecuting attorney who,
among other things, "shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by law."
Those duties are specifically set forth in I.C. § 31-2604, which provides in
relevant part:
Duties of prosecuting attorney. - It is the duty of the
prosecuting attorney:
1. To prosecute or defend all actions, applications or motions,
civil or criminal, in the district court of his county in which the
people, or the state, or the county, are interested, or are a party;
and when the place of trial is changed in any such action or
proceeding to another county, he must prosecute or defend the
same in such other county.
I.C. § 31-2604(1) (emphasis added).

Pursuant to the plain language of this

statute, the authority of a county prosecutor to prosecute criminal actions is
limited to those actions "in the district court of his county." The only exception to
this limitation exists "when the place of trial is changed ... to another county," in
which such case the prosecutor "must prosecute or defend the same in such
other county." Nothing in this statute permits a county prosecutor to initiate a
criminal prosecution in any county of his or choosing, nor does it permit an
elected prosecutor in one county to otherwise usurp the authority of an elected
prosecutor in a second county by deciding whether criminal charges should be
pursued in the second county.
Neither I.C. §§ 1-1622 nor 19-304, relied on by Baker, compel a contrary
conclusion.

Idaho Code § 1-1622 simply confers on judicial officers "all the
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means necessary" to carry out the authority granted to them by statute. Because
the authority granted to county prosecutors is limited by statute to the
prosecution of criminal actions "in the district court of his county," I.C. § 312604(1), nothing in I.C. § 1-1622 would confer upon county prosecutors the
authority to prosecute, dismiss or negotiate the resolution of a criminal action
pending in the district court of another county. Likewise, for the reasons already
set forth in Section C, supra, the fact that venue over criminal offenses may be
appropriate in more than one county pursuant to I.C. § 19-304 does not give the
prosecuting attorney of one county authority to prevent the prosecution of those
criminal offenses in another county where venue is also appropriate unless, of
course, the prosecution is barred by I. C. §§ 19-305 and/or 19-316 and/or double
jeopardy.
In short, nothing in Idaho's constitution or statutory provisions supports
Baker's argument that the individual prosecuting agencies of this state have
authority (either actual or apparent) to bind each other to their respective plea
agreements without the other prosecuting agency's consent. This Court should
therefore adopt the reasoning of the cases cited in the state's opening brief and
hold, consistent therewith, that the Boise City Attorney's Office had neither actual
nor apparent authority to bind the Coeur d'Alene City Office in the plea
negotiations that resolved the Ada County case. (See Appellant's brief, pp.7-19.)
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E.

The Doctrine Of "Fundamental Fairness" Does Not Compel Dismissal Of
The Kootenai County Charges
Baker argues that, even if the Boise City Attorney's Office had no

authority to bind the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office to the Ada County plea
agreement, the doctrine of "fundamental fairness" nevertheless dictates that he
"be free from prosecution for the eleven no contact order violations" in the
Kootenai County case. (Respondent's brief, pp.11-12.) The state acknowledges
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a
requirement of fundamental fairness in all criminal proceedings. !;.,lb State v.
Green, 149 Idaho 706, 709, 239 P.3d 811, 814 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985); State v. Lewis, 144 Idaho 64,66, 156 P.3d
565, 567 (2007); Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19, 576 P.2d 1052,
1053 (1978». Contrary to Baker's assertions, however, "fundamental fairness" is
not itself a freestanding claim that allows a defendant to avoid proving a violation
of a recognized due process right. See State v. Bartlett, 2013 WL 500394, *6
(Idaho Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. Scraggins, 153 Idaho 867, 292 P.3d 258
(2012» ("Even an assertion based on fundamental fairness, which is akin to the
claim in this case, requires a due process analysis."). The state submits that,
because Baker has demonstrated no violation of any statutory or constitutional
right, he has failed to show any fundamental unfairness. Even if, however, the
doctrine of "fundamental fairness" extends beyond explicit constitutional or
statutory rights, Baker has shown no unfairness, fundamental or otherwise;
contrary to Baker's assertions on appeal, there was nothing fundamentally unfair
about not requiring the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office to dismiss the
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already pending Kootenai County charges based upon the Ada County plea
agreement to which the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office was not a party and
otherwise did not consent.
Baker's arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, there is no evidence in
the record that either the Boise City Attorney's Office or Coeur d'Alene City
Attorney's intentionally misled Baker or otherwise acted in bad faith. Although
the record suggests the Boise City Attorney's Office was aware when it entered
the Ada County plea agreement that the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office
was also pursuing or, at least, investigating protection order violations that were
reported in Kootenai County (see Appellant's brief, p.3, n.3), there is no
indication in the record that the Boise City Attorney's Office actively withheld that
information from Baker. Nor is there any evidence that the Boise City Attorney's
Office intended by the Ada County plea agreement to mislead Baker into
believing that the agreement to not file or pursue any additional charges arising
out of Baker's violations of the protection order was binding on every prosecutor
in the State. Indeed, for the reasons already set forth in Section B, supra, the
only reasonable interpretation of the Ada County plea agreement was that it
bound only the Boise City Prosecutor's Office, as that was the only prosecuting
agency that was a party to the agreement that resolved the Ada County case.
In arguing that it was fundamentally unfair to allow the Kootenai County
charges to proceed, Baker places great emphasis on the fact that, at his
sentencing in the Ada County case, the Boise City prosecutor played a recording
of the telephone messages that were the subject of the Kootenai County
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prosecution. (Respondent's brief, p.12.) As noted by the magistrate in denying
Baker's motion to dismiss, however, that the Boise City prosecutor relied on the
recording "in aggravation of [Baker's] sentence" did not mean that Baker could
not be prosecuted for that same conduct by another prosecuting agency in
another county where venue was also appropriate. (11/5/10 Tr., p.50, Ls.14-21.)
If Baker believed he could not be so prosecuted under the terms of the Ada
County plea agreement, he was not without a remedy; upon being arrested on
the Kootenai County charges Baker could have moved to withdraw his plea in
the Ada County case or, alternatively, could have sought post-conviction relief
from his Ada County conviction.

That Baker would prefer dismissal of the

Kootenai County charges, even though the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office
was neither aware of nor a party to the Ada County plea agreement, does not
demonstrate that the prosecution of him in Kootenai County was fundamentally
unfair. See Green 149 Idaho at 710, 239 P.3d at 815 ("The Due Process Clause
requires procedures that afford fundamental fairness, not procedures that are
maximally beneficial to the defendant .... ").

18

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's
intermediate appellate decision that reversed the magistrate's order denying
Baker's motion to dismiss.
DATED this 3rd day of April 2013.
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